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 1
Risk, Commercialism and Social Purpose: Repositioning the English Housing 
Association sector 
 
Abstract 
Originally seen as the ‘third arm’ of UK housing policy, the independent, not-for-
profit housing association sector had long been seen as effective in ‘filling the gap’ 
where the state or market were unable to provide for households in need. Since the 
1980s in particular, successive governments had viewed housing associations in 
favourable terms as efficient, semi-autonomous social businesses, capable of 
leveraging significant private funding.  By 2015 in contrast, central government had 
come to perceive the sector as inefficient, bureaucratic and wasteful of public subsidy. 
Making use of institutional theory, this paper considers this paradigm shift and 
examines the organisational responses to an increasingly challenging operating 
environment. By focusing, in particular, on large London housing associations, the 
paper analyses their strategic decision-making to address the opportunities and threats 
presented.  The paper argues that in facing an era of minimal subsidy, low security 
and high risk, the 2015 reforms represent a critical juncture for the sector. Housing 
organisations face a stark dilemma about whether to continue a strategy of ‘profit for 
purpose’ or to embrace an unambiguously commercial ethos. The article contends that 
the trajectory of decision-making (although not unidirectional) leads ultimately 
towards an increased exposure to risk and vulnerability to changes in the housing 
market. More fundamentally, the attempt to reconcile social and commercial logics is 
likely to have wider consequences for the legitimacy of the sector. 
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Introduction 
 
The need to manage risk has become a widely accepted feature of organisational 
environments within the public, private and voluntary sectors. Operating within a 
turbulent context, the not-for-profit housing sector has also struggled to balance the 
demands of commercialism and a need to retain a core social purpose (see for 
example, Morrison 2016a).  Such tensions have been exacerbated by the removal of 
public subsidy, by changes to regulatory frameworks and an environment 
characterised by chronic uncertainty. As Czischke et al (2012) argue, greater 
knowledge is required about how not-for-profit housing organisations are responding 
to contemporary challenges, not only to ensure their business survival but also so that 
they continue to perform a critical role in providing decent homes to those who 
cannot afford market rents.   
 
The above pressures are not unique to the UK.  Increasing state withdrawal of funding 
in Australia, for example, has forced not-for-profit housing organisations to reconcile 
their involvement in commercial activities with a desire to retain their social mission 
(see Milligan et al 2012).  The USA has seen not-for profit housing providers look 
towards commercial diversification to cross subsidise social activities (see Bratt et al, 
2016) whilst in the Netherlands, housing associations in the 1990s diversified towards 
market housing sales to generate funding. The level of exposure to risk amongst 
Dutch housing associations, however, resulted in systemic failure, requiring State 
intervention and a return to the core social functions of managing and developing 
housing for low income groups (see Nieboer and Gruis, 2014; Van der Kuij et al 
2016).  
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Drawing on institutional theory, the purpose of this article is to consider how English 
housing associations (HAs) have responded to these contemporary pressures and how 
they have managed competing demands in an increasingly challenging environment. 
In focusing on large London HAs, the article considers how different obligations have 
helped re-define organisational purposes and strategic priorities.  The article analyses 
how London HAs reconcile what appear to be incompatible aspirations between 
maintaining a social purpose alongside the demands of a commercial orientation, as 
they seek to cross subsidise their operations and to deliver Government housing 
targets (G15, 2016).    
 
An understanding of how the large London HAs are responding to contemporary 
government pressures offers salient lessons for other HAs yet to undergo 
organisational change.  By focusing on this critical juncture in the housing sector’s 
history, the article not only highlights the trajectory of change for the HA sector but 
also considers the implications for the future of affordable housing provision in the 
modern welfare state.  Lessons can also be applied to urban policy in other parts of 
the UK as well as to a wider international context.  These lessons highlight key 
pressures and dilemmas confronting urban managers, as they struggle to provide 
services to local communities within an environment characterised by severe resource 
constraints.  
 
The theory of institutional logics  
 
Institutional theory offers a critical lens to analyse processes of organisational change, 
highlighting the rationale for decision-making, the capacity for autonomy, the 
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relationship between voluntary and statutory sector agencies and changing power 
relations between service provider and local communities. The concept of 
‘institutional logics’ in particular, a term introduced by Alford and Friedland (1985) 
has captured the contradictory practices and beliefs inherent in the institutions of 
modern western societies, helping to explain organising principles and providing 
social actors with ‘a set of rules and conventions for deciding which problem gets 
attended to, which solutions get considered and which solutions get linked to which 
situation’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p.114). The theory of institutional logics 
provides an important link between individual agency and cognitions on the one hand 
and socially constructed institutional practices and rule structures on the other. Logics 
provide a sense of identity, become embodied in practice, and are sustained and 
reproduced by cultural assumptions and political struggles with organisations both 
enabled and constrained by the prevailing institutional logic.   
 
The institutional logics perspective invariably emphasises the existence of competing 
logics within a particular field and the ways in which different logics assume priority 
at different points in time. Whilst scholars have long emphasised the role of the State 
in regulating institutions, increasing attention has focused on the rise of a market logic 
and its effect on organisational behaviour and action (Scott 2001, p.51).  Moreover, 
interest has grown on how the ascendency of a market logic has accompanied a 
decline in alternative logics, most notably relating to State-based regulation. Zuker 
(1987) contends that individuals and organisations rely on their understanding of this 
interplay between institutional logics in order to gain access to societal resources, 
aligning themselves with the prevailing logic in order to ensure their long-term 
survival.   
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As Thornton and Ocasio (2008) contend, these struggles to ensure legitimacy, control 
over market competition and contestation of State rules and regulations shape 
organisations’ logics of behaviour and action.  Under conditions of neoliberalism, 
organisational status and power have become increasingly driven by economics, 
which has further embedded the market logic within the field (p.112).  Portfolio and 
risk management status as well as expertise in finance, for instance, have become 
progressively valued as the market logic has gained prominence in welfare provision 
and public policy. Whilst the ascendency of the market logic does not necessarily 
imply a rejection of other logics it does require decision makers to switch their 
attention to issues and solutions that are consistent with the orientation of the 
dominant logic. Organisations thus follow suit, developing structural arrangements 
and production processes that conform and over time become institutionalised (Zuker, 
1987).  
 
At the same time, organisations react to their institutional environment in variegated 
ways, as they possess distinctive ideological values, identities, and styles of 
leadership, that influence their goals, purposes and logics of investment (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 2008). Consequently, they adopt different strategies to take advantage of 
opportunities afforded by the dominant market logic. As Scott (2001) contends, 
certain organisations are more effective in aligning themselves with dominant rules 
and conventions. Described as ‘active players not passive pawns’ (p.179) such 
organisations have the capacity to respond to external pressures in creative and 
strategic ways. Highlighting the way in which competing institutional logics are 
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mediated and the organisational capacity for agency provides a critical avenue of 
research (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p.243).    
 
A growing body of work has emerged within housing scholarship, seeking to 
understand how the theory of institutional logics can be applied to interpret the 
relationship between social and commercial goals (see for instance, Mullins, 2006; 
Sacranie 2012; Blessing, 2012; Czischke et al 2012, Morrison, 2016, a and b).  
 
Since the late 1970s and at an international level, the emergence of neoliberal welfare 
policies characterised by competition, entrepreneurialism, free markets and minimal 
State intervention has become an increasingly noticeable feature of the public policy 
agenda (Harvey, 2005, p.2). Under conditions of neoliberalism, the housing sector in 
general, and HAs in particular, have therefore experienced increasing levels of 
marketisation, exposure to risk; processes underpinned by the predominance of the 
financial sector (Hodkinson et al, 2013). In broad terms, housing organisations have 
been compelled to retreat from the traditional provision of subsidised rental housing, 
towards market renting and promoting varieties of homeownership.  
 
The HA sector has also experienced growth in hybrid governance structures and 
development of diverse housing products to address the complex financial and 
regulatory challenges of the prevailing market logic (Morrison, 2016a). Moreover, 
sophisticated treasury management and financial portfolio analyses have been 
developed in response to the replacement of public with private funding and to exploit 
commercial opportunities (Morrison, 2016b; Tang et al 2016). Before examining the 
organisational responses to these competing demands, some context is given to 
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explain the changing perception of the sector and to analyse the key structural 
constraints that have compelled English HAs towards a more commercial logic. 
 
The changing landscape for English housing associations 
 
Originally seen as the ‘third arm’ of UK housing policy, the purpose of the 
independent HA sector was to ‘fill the gap’ where the state or market was unable to 
provide for households in need (Malpass, 2000). Since the 1980s and influenced by 
neoliberal ideology, governments had viewed these organisations as preferred 
partners in developing and managing subsidised rental housing, in preference to 
supposedly bureaucratic and inefficient local authorities (Mullins and Murie 2006). 
As a consequence, the sector faced rapid expansion and following the Housing Act 
1988 became the main providers of new social housing. Their ability to raise private 
finance enabled HAs to develop affordable housing and the sector expanded further 
through transfers of formerly local authority owned stock. Once viewed as an 
‘outstanding success’, the sector was praised for its capacity to combine the disparate 
skills of entrepreneurialism and sound financial management (a market logic) with a 
commitment to a strong social purpose in providing good quality, affordable 
accommodation to households in need (Mullins and Pawson, 2010). 
 
However, the privileged position of the housing association sector began to change, 
initially following the government’s 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, resulting 
in spending cuts of around 60% in 2015, accompanied by a statement that government 
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grant funding would end after 2018 (HCA 2015a)
1
.  The 2010 Coalition government 
established an affordable housing programme, allowing HAs to charge up to 80% of 
local market rents, introduced fixed-term tenancies (under the Localism Act 2011) 
and restricted benefit payments (under the Welfare Reform Act, 2012).  
 
The 2015 General Election marked a critical juncture for the sector following an 
unexpected Conservative majority government. Based on manifesto commitments, the 
government introduced proposals to extend the Right to Buy (RTB) to housing 
association tenants and proposed to restrict the ability of landlords to increase rents 
(by 1% per annum on social housing properties over a four year period) (HM 
Treasury, 2015). Whilst the RTB proposals proved highly contentious, the proposal to 
limit rent increases had a more profound impact on the sector, disrupting business 
plans, jeopardising income projections and threatening financial forecasts (HCA 
2015b)
2
. 
 
In addition to the pressures of grant reduction, rent restrictions and welfare reform, 
the HA sector, for almost the first time, was subjected to significant censure from 
central government. Criticisms were directed at their inefficiency and lack of progress 
in meeting the Government’s ambition to build 1 million new homes by 2020 (UK 
Parliament, 2016). These arguments were accompanied by a scarcely veiled threat 
that the government would act if housing associations failed to cooperate. As the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer warned: ‘They can either work with us…or there can be 
a more confrontational relationship’ (Osborne, 2015).  In what appeared to be a 
                                                        
1 Government capital grant allocations were reduced from £8.8bn to £4.4bn in the HCA’s 2010-14 
Affordable Homes programme and to £1.7bn in the 2015-18 programme (HCA 2015a) 
2
 In 2013, the HA sector’s rent formula of consumer price index (CPI) plus 1% for 10 years was agreed, 
so this U-turn in government policy in effect tore up previous rental guidance. 
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sustained campaign, these criticisms were accompanied by profoundly hostile press 
attention. An article in the (centre-right) Spectator magazine referred to housing 
associations as ‘the true villains of the property crisis’ and described the sector as 
‘combining public sector lethargy and private sector greed’ (Clark, 2015). An enquiry 
conducted by a national television channel (Channel 4 news) in 2015 was presented 
under the headline ‘why are housing associations failing to build enough homes?’ 
(Ebrahini 2015). Media reports also criticised ‘low performing and highly paid’ 
housing association CEOs – ‘£350,000 salary for Britain’s worst housing Chiefs’ as 
one headline expressed it (The Times, 18/3/16).  
 
Housing associations therefore faced a challenging policy environment. Whilst the 
English HA sector has long diversified into commercial activities to cross subsidise 
their core social functions (see Malpass 2000; Mullins and Pawson 2010), 
contemporary organisations face stark decisions about how to reposition themselves 
in response to the above pressures. Given the scale of grant reductions the sector has 
chosen to diversify by developing more systematic strategies for market sale. 
However, such an approach inevitably implies greater exposure to risk, not least 
through fluctuations in the wider housing market and uncertainty in raising finance 
from capital markets (Wainwright & Manville 2017). This new environment therefore 
presents acute tensions for the sector, both in terms of structural constraints and 
opportunities to exercise autonomy. As Morrison (2016a) argues, HAs need to 
develop a portfolio of commercial activity to fund their core businesses. At the same 
time they remain committed (for the most part) to a sense of social responsibility to 
existing (and future) tenants and are obliged to protect their assets from unnecessary 
risk.   
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As institutional theory maintains, the conflicting regulatory logics commonly 
observed within public policy (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) are clearly evident within 
the English housing association sector. Thus the Homes and Communities Agency 
(HCA) supports the establishment of unregistered profit-making subsidiaries to 
deliver HAs’ commercial activities, such as market sales - such bodies are not 
constrained by charitable rules and can benefit from tax efficiencies.  However, as 
these vehicles lack direct accountability (Morrison 2016a) HCA (2014; 2015a) 
government regulations specify that HAs must provide assurances that their social 
housing assets are not put at risk and that the public value within them is protected
3
.  
The sector therefore faces a challenging environment of relative autonomy, combined 
with continuing regulatory, financial and political pressures. In order to analyse these 
processes in greater depth, the next section examines how the major London HAs 
have responded to these pressures. 
 
Research methods 
 
Given the wide variation between HAs and organisational contexts, in order to 
analyse strategic decision-making, Gruis (2008) argues, it is important to select 
similar sized organisations operating in the same market conditions, to allow the 
external environment to be held relatively constant.  For the present study, the sample 
was restricted to the large HAs (managing over 15,000 units each) operating in 
London (collectively known as the G15). Given unprecedented pressures to deliver 
                                                        
3
 HCA (2014) para. 5.1 sets out an explicit expectation that regulated parents ensure their non-
regulated subsidiaries do not create excessive risk to regulated assets – there is therefore indirect 
accountability imposed on unregistered vehicles. 
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new housing in the capital, in response to growing demands from existing and future 
tenants and the context of a market characterised by rising housing prices, the 
propensity to be market orientated in London is therefore extremely high (Savills 
2016a). 
 
The research entailed in-depth, semi-structured interviews with members of the G15 
HAs’ senior executive teams. The purpose of the interviews was to determine how 
individual organisations had revised their business plans, and in particular 
development programmes, in response to prevailing circumstances and to determine 
the rationale behind their strategic decision-making. The study aimed to identify the 
key risks of diversification and to consider how far a market logic can be reconciled 
with maintaining core social functions.  
 
Given that senior managers would be expected to portray their organisations in a 
positive light, the interview responses were compared with documentary evidence to 
ascertain how far the claims could be supported or refuted by other forms of data.  
These data included analysis of HCA Global Accounts, which collect performance 
information about HAs’ charitable registered status, including the extent to which 
surpluses made from diversification were used to fund non-social housing activities. 
Annual reports, financial accounts and company press releases were also analysed to 
consider the range of commercial (and non-commercial) activities undertaken within 
the group structures.  Through this triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data, 
involving crosschecking and verification of senior managers’ statements, the analysis 
examined taken-for-granted assumptions and values. In doing so, the research was 
able to highlight the relationship between the logics of social and commercial 
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investment, their impact on strategic priorities and their influence on organisational 
behaviour (see also Morrison 2016a and b).  
 
Strategic decision making within London housing associations  
  
The G15 HAs represent the largest organisations working in the not-for-profit housing 
sector. They own and manage over 550,000 homes (accounting for 21% of the 
housing sector stock), provide accommodation for 1 in 10 Londoners and range in 
size from just over 15,000 properties (East Thames) to 71,700 properties (London & 
Quadrant). Historically they have been highly successful in their ability to generate 
funding; they leveraged £15.5bn in private investment (representing 33% of sector’s 
net debt) and generated 47% of the sector’s overall surplus in 2015 (HCA 2016).  
They have an active development programme, having provided 16,000 affordable 
rental homes and 6,400 shared ownership properties between 2013 and 2016 (G15 
2016). Nevertheless, the large London HAs acknowledge that they could increase 
output and have suggested that collectively their development programme could 
increase from 93,000 to 180,000 over 10 years in order to help deliver the 
government’s national housing targets (Stothart, 2016). 
 
An increase in development activity is undoubtedly needed in the London housing 
market where it is estimated that 50,000 homes per year are needed to keep pace with 
housing need - output in 2012-3 was 21,900 (Wilson, 2015). London has the highest 
housing prices in the country (the average housing price in 2016 was £482,000 in 
London, compared to £234,000 in England) (ONS, House Price Index) and 
increasingly high rent levels (an average of £281 per week, compared to £145 outside 
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London) (London Housing Commission, 2016). The capital is therefore beset with 
chronic problems of affordability and whilst local authority development remains at 
historically low levels, the London market requires a dynamic and growing housing 
association sector that can respond to housing need.  
 
As noted above, the HA sector has faced extensive public criticism in recent years, 
both for its lack of success in meeting housing need and for the level of remuneration 
offered to senior staff – although the salaries of the G15 Chief Executives (CEO) vary 
from £155,000 (East Thames) to £300,706 (Affinity Sutton). These salary figures do 
not necessarily equate with the size of organisation; CEO pay per home varies from 
£3.69 to £10.25 and even the trade magazine for housing professionals has questioned 
whether these salaries represent value for money (McCabe, 2016).  
 
The G15 HAs are financially robust, with surpluses rising to a total of nearly £1.5bn 
for 2015. Whilst this could be attributable to a favourable macroeconomic condition 
and historically low interest rates, such figures have encouraged the government to 
believe that the sector could become self-financing and should no longer be reliant on 
government subsidy (see Walker 2014, for example). In order to consider these and 
other issues further, the following sections examine how these HAs have responded to 
the specific challenges presented by an operating environment characterised by 
turbulent change. 
 
 
 
Establishing a commercial logic  
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As noted above, the dominance of a market logic has been a longstanding debate 
within the sector. However, given the scale of change following the 2010 and 2015 
General Elections, the G15 respondents expressed little doubt that government 
reforms heralded a paradigm shift for the sector, illustrating how far decision-making 
was driven by exogenous factors. Whilst the Chancellor’s rent reduction 
announcement came as an unpleasant shock, respondents were keen to suggest that 
they had anticipated the trajectory of change (choosing to highlight their relative 
autonomy). Hence, by the July 2015 Budget, ‘the writing was on the wall’ as one 
CEO commented, adding that ‘all that happened is that the (government’s) rent cut 
has made what we were intending to do all the more urgent.’ In the words of another 
CEO ‘we had to do what we could to make the business more efficient’
4
. Respondents 
were keen to emphasise how seriously they had taken the efficiency agenda (even 
before the centrally imposed rent reduction): ‘I have spent the last three years really 
driving down operating costs’ as one CEO commented. For many, the external 
environment presented a valuable opportunity for organisational change. For 
example:  
 
In a way it takes the external pressure of radical cost cutting driven by 
government to make organisations really think…But you need to be careful 
what you wish for. I wouldn’t encourage any more radical action, but I think 
some good will come from it (Interview) 
 
                                                        
4
 Projected income losses from an impact of rent reductions over four years varied by organisations, for 
instance AmicusHorizon (£39m), Affinity Sutton (£38m) and A2 Dominion (£53m).  
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This commercial logic was manifested in a number of ways, the first of which was an 
increased reliance on property sales income as a proportion of turnover. Table 1 
highlights the extent to which sales from non-social housing development and first 
tranche sales of shared ownership housing products has grown for each of the G15 
HAs.
5
  Whilst the share of this development activity as a proportion of total turnover 
varied by organisation, from Catalyst (43%) to Circle (10%) in 2015, this upward 
trend indicates the degree to which the G15 has become increasingly reliant on non-
social housing development.  All the CEOs interviewed acknowledged that they were 
looking to increase the proportion of market sales within their development 
programmes as grant diminished, arguing that the cash receipts generated were 
needed to cross subsidise the delivery of affordable homes.  ‘I think it will play an 
increasingly important role in how new homes are funded. If you move away from a 
grant model you have to look at all sources of capital’ as one CEO suggested.  
 
A second illustration of a dominant commercial logic was an increased exposure to 
risk, as HAs were subject to cyclical changes in the market.  Despite London 
benefiting from above average housing price rises, this market exposure increased 
their vulnerability to housing market fluctuations. Delays in initiation and completion 
of schemes, slowdowns in sales, reductions in market prices and failures to achieve 
projected sales incomes represented threats to business plan assumptions and to an 
ability to comply with loan covenants. “Even London is not impervious to shocks”, as 
one CEO remarked. 
 
                                                        
5
 N.B The HCA Global accounts 2015 for the first time recorded commercial diversification activities 
of HAs’ registered entities (HCA 2016). This dataset under-records individual organisation’s 
commercial activities carried out in non-registered subsidiaries (e.g. Peabody Group’s building for sale 
(132,883) was nearly ten times the amount undertaken in its registered Trust (13,858)). 
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A greater reliance on cross subsidy from commercial activities resulted in 
increasingly sophisticated approaches to financial risk modelling to accommodate a 
complex business environment. However, G15 members believed they were well 
placed to address these challenges. The main strength of these large London HAs was 
their asset bases that offered a strong competitive advantage and leverage for 
borrowing: ‘developers do not have the same equity base’ as one respondent 
expressed it. Although a reliance on market sales generated risk if property prices and 
values fell, many organisations had established contingency arrangements, for 
example by changing the tenure profile to shared ownership, private renting, or even 
affordable housing if necessary. Unlike private developers, HAs were in a position 
where they could maintain their existing properties and defer making a profit – 
‘diversification allows us these options’. As one respondent explained: 
 
the more you move towards this self-funding model and move away from 
government grant the more you become pro-cyclical.  Whereas the grant 
funding model was effectively a counter-cyclical model… This model is clearly 
about big market exposure, so [we are] making sure we have plans and the right 
prudential limits around how much exposure we have at any given time to keep 
the rating agencies and funders happy and to make sure the business is protected.  
 
Nevertheless, as Scott (2001) contends, alignment with the dominant market logic can 
be precarious: ‘If the market falls, the cross subsidy element would be reduced at a 
stroke’, a CEO argued. Guarantees that there would be no impairment risks to social 
housing assets were therefore necessary as these complex, hybrid organisations 
moved towards a market logic, albeit one which carried not only financial but also 
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reputational risks.  Whilst there was a clear opportunity cost of undertaking 
commercial activities, a number of organisations also saw this new direction of travel 
as an opportunity to be seized, as the CEO of Genesis Housing Association argued 
publicly after the July 2015 Budget announcement: 
 
We could become something different. I don’t know where this will 
lead…There are great opportunities opening up to reduce some of the 
regulation we go through… putting your head in the sand means that someone 
tramples all over you. I don’t want Genesis to do that. I want Genesis to be in 
the forefront of change (Neil Hadden, interview, quoted in Inside Housing, 
31/7/15). 
 
These new risk factors required changes in organisational structures and governance 
arrangements and many HAs had undergone fundamental restructuring and developed 
new business models (see Figure 1 which depicts a typical G15 group structure).  
Whilst most of the HAs had established complex, hybrid group structures, pursued 
innovative borrowing techniques and created a range of non-charitable subsidiaries to 
carry out market activities prior to the July 2015 Budget announcement, much higher 
expectations were now placed on their commercial operations.  At the same time, the 
governing boards were required to have higher-level skills to understand and 
recommend business decisions from non-social housing activities as well as the 
capacity to analyse the significance of new interdependencies within the organisation. 
These new skills implied that Board members were likely to be recruited on the basis 
of their private sector, financial management experience, rather than as local 
community representatives. 
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This commercial logic not only affected decision-making, organisational strategies 
and Board membership, it also influenced the location of development activity. In the 
words of one respondent, the key to minimise risk was to ‘buy land wisely and 
diversify geographically’, which meant that due to difficulties of developing within 
inner London, activities tended to focus on so-called ‘zone 3’ (outer London) 
boroughs. At the same time, these constraints also offered considerable opportunity, 
as HAs were considered to be ‘attractive partners’ by private developers, given their 
ability to cope with risk.  A number of respondents maintained that joint ventures 
would become more significant within this changed environment, and they in 
particular made development within inner London areas more feasible (in theory at 
least) – ‘it allows more and more to happen’ as one commented. Respondents also 
welcomed an increased autonomy to take decisions, often complaining of continuing 
government interference. In the words of one CEO ‘I’d love to be in a position in 
some respects to pay back all the grant, because then I would be truly independent’ 
(Interview). 
 
The final component of a commercial logic was illustrated by the way that HAs were 
seeking to change the socio-economic composition of their residents. All respondents 
agreed that the tenure mix would have to change following reductions in subsidy and 
cuts in rental incomes on their social housing properties. As the G15 collectively 
announced to the CLG (2015) Select Committee (G15 2015):  
 
The Government has set the HA sector a big challenge by cutting rents. We 
are being asked to deliver development with less funding… Ultimately the 
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G15 are net borrowers every year…Smaller surpluses will result in reduced 
supply of new homes… We are determined to keep developing but it is highly 
likely that the number of affordable homes for rent will be a smaller 
proportion of overall building (p.1) 
 
One respondent, for example, explained that before the rent cut their development 
programme was predicated on a third affordable housing, a third shared ownership 
and a third market rentals and market sales – ‘now it is 10% affordable housing, 50% 
shared ownership and 40% market sales and rented’.  Many of the other G15 
organisations mirrored this trend, with the CEOs justifying their course of action in 
order to maintain the economic viability of their development programmes. 
 
Retaining a social purpose 
 
Whilst a commercial logic clearly played an increasingly dominant role in discussions 
of organisational purpose, senior managers and Chief Executives argued that they 
remained committed to an organisational purpose driven by a social logic, regardless 
of economic contingencies. As shown in Table 2, turnover from social housing 
lettings constitutes a high proportion of total turnover in each of the G15 
organisations, varying from Catalyst (68%) to Circle (98%) in 2015. As large London 
HAs, these organisations benefited greatly from the high gross book value of their 
portfolio, with figures well above the national average. As a consequence, they were 
heavily reliant upon borrowing against their social housing assets to fund 
development programmes. Table 2 indicates how the gross book value of assets 
ranged from over £5.5bn for London & Quadrant (with the largest social housing 
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stock) to just under £1.2bn (in the case of Network, with the lowest number of 
properties). These figures illustrated how the sector was becoming increasingly reliant 
on these historic, social housing assets to raise capital funding. However, this capital 
funding was largely devoted to market housing, raising questions about how far 
public assets were used to finance entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Whilst the reliance on turnover from social housing lettings continued to be seen as 
the core business for the London HAs, as seen above the reductions in rental income 
following the July 2015 Budget announcements removed significant capacity from 
their business plans. Nevertheless, respondents stressed that they had adopted a 
pragmatic approach, describing their strategy as an ‘adaptive mechanism’ to enable 
cross subsidy which would enable them to realise their social purpose. At the same 
time they argued: ‘We were clear that what we didn’t want to do is stop doing some 
of our core activities’. This CEO explained the distinctive purpose of the organisation 
as follows: 
 
the thing that differentiates us is that we are clear that we do not want financial 
pressures to drive a reduction in service quality. Whether withdrawing from 
anti-social behaviour (ASB) initiatives, from community development activity, 
resident involvement or jobs and training…. If anything these things become 
even more important as communities struggle with welfare cuts and poverty. 
 
The difficulty was that the sector was at the same time repositioning itself to focus on 
a clear set of market driven priorities. Thus, whilst some emphasised that they would 
continue to provide core services, many had chosen to end their involvement in 
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activity such as providing supporting housing for vulnerable groups, given the 
uncertainty surrounding future sources of income.  Hence 
 
we need clarity from Government and we cannot justify putting internal 
subsidies into these extra care schemes - £150,000 subsidy is needed per unit 
and these schemes just do not stack up. We are disappointed as there is still 
obviously a need for them.   
 
All organisations interviewed emphasised, however, that they would continue to fund 
additional ‘housing plus’ work, which was seen as a ‘community investment’ despite 
often being a loss-making activity (in monetary terms). As Table 2 indicates, four of 
the organisations recorded a deficit from their non-core (‘other’) social housing 
activities, which continued to be seen as important. In the words of one respondent: 
‘if we don’t provide these community investments, who will? It is part of our social 
mission’. This social logic formed an important source of motivation for many in the 
sector; ‘we have dedicated staff. We make money on other aspects of our business; 
why cut back on this aspect?’  
 
As a finance director commented, providing debt advice, employment and training 
opportunities made financial sense as ‘to make the community more economically 
active is better for us and better for the community’.  For many respondents, the social 
value of this activity not only could be translated into financial value, but also had 
considerable multiplier effects.  Whilst the core social purpose remains providing and 
managing subsidised rental housing, the broader housing plus role is ‘what the sector 
does’, as this director argued.  Although community investment would inevitably 
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remain a very small proportion of total turnover, respondents argued that the 
expenditure ‘would not be touched’, despite a recalibration of business plans to take 
into account the rent reductions
6
.  
 
Moreover, all of the G15 respondents contacted expressed a continued strong 
commitment to sub-market rented housing, albeit at reduced levels: ‘It is all very well 
for government policy to be wholly based on home ownership but they ultimately 
need subsidised rental housing - whether they like it or not’. Respondents expressed a 
firm commitment to affordable sub-market rented housing. As one CEO explained 
 
We have a new development strategy, but what I can say for sure is that there 
will be a proportion of the programme with rents around current social rent 
levels (around 45% of market levels) to ensure that we can offer properties to 
people who are on benefits, nominated from local authorities.  
 
Respondents were keen to argue that there was no inherent contradiction between 
social and commercial logics. They are ‘not mutually exclusive’ and ‘they are 
entwined’, represented common responses. Yet they were also clear to stress that their 
mission was now to meet ‘a range of housing need’ rather than simply 
accommodating low income households. This commitment to social purpose 
represented sincerely held views. However, there remained the question of how far 
the sector could continue to sustain loss-making activity within an environment 
characterised by competition, financial risk and marketisation. What seemed clear 
was that there was a disjuncture between a rhetoric of social purpose and the reality of 
                                                        
6 The G15’s community and economic development programmes were worth over £40m in total in 
2015 (G15 2016). 
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commercial business strategy. Whilst the G15 HAs’ revised organisational direction 
responds to affordability pressures experienced by a wide spectrum of residents, there 
is an opportunity cost in diverting attention away from housing for those in greatest 
need. The next section therefore subjects the above claims to critical scrutiny. 
 
Discussion 
 
Although the changes are not unidirectional, the growth and prevalence of 
neoliberalism in housing policy has not only led to a market logic to assume primary 
significance, but has been supported by a regulatory agenda, particularly within the 
UK that has emphasized sound financial management as the key (if not sole) criterion 
for success (Hodkinson et al 2012). This market logic has in turn assumed paramount 
importance in determining organisational behavior and actions, as witnessed in HA 
sector (as well as in wider welfare policy).   In considering both structural constraints 
and the capacity for agency, institutional logics perspective offers a way to examine 
how organisations can take advantage of the prevailing logic to further elaborate, 
manipulate and use to their own advantage (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), within 
certain parameters at least. The empirical results from this study support these 
arguments.  
 
The responses from the G15 London HAs’ senior managers suggested a collective 
consensus about the importance of retaining a strong social purpose. However, 
scrutiny of the business models applied represented a fundamental challenge to this 
ethos. In an attempt to ensure their long run survival, the large London HAs had not 
only aligned themselves with the dominant market logic, they also had to ‘switch their 
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attention to issues and solutions…that were consistent with (its) orientation’ (Zuker 
1987), namely development for outright market sale that over time would constitute a 
significant proportion of their development programmes.  Making use of the market 
rhetoric to justify their re-defined business purpose and chosen course of action 
(Thornton & Ocasio 2008), the G15 London organisations had attempted to position 
themselves as ‘active players’ (Scott 2001, p.179) in delivering Government housing 
targets that prioritise homeownership. These developments indicate the London HAs’ 
direction of travel towards the idea of what they liked to term ‘profit for purpose’ 
(Mullins and Pawson 2010).  
 
London HAs have specific advantages to pursue market-orientated strategies, as a 
result of their extensive unencumbered asset base (containing individual properties 
worth several £million). This asset base provided considerable borrowing capacity 
and allowed large surpluses to be produced from social housing lettings and remains 
the key means of differentiation between London and other UK areas.  Moreover, in 
response to government reforms since at least 2010, the G15 HAs have led the way in 
commercial diversification strategies, placing considerable emphasis on a strong 
business culture, justified as helping to optimise social outcomes. All of the 
organisations had plans to increase the proportion of market sales and were becoming 
progressively more reliant on the income generated from these activities in future 
business plans. As they move towards more complex hybrid group structures with a 
greater level of commercial activity in non-charitable subsidiaries, this business 
model will inevitably increase their risk exposures.   
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However, as the tenure mix changes in new schemes and the amount of sub-market 
rental provision falls to allow development programmes to remain commercially 
viable, tensions will become more explicit as the HAs seek to reconcile competing 
social and commercial goals.  Inevitably, they will face difficult choices in meeting 
their social duties to house the lowest income households in London, whilst a market 
logic compel organisations to abandon their social roots, as they widen their resident 
profile and divert their attention to building housing for outright sale.  
 
Notwithstanding the above points, some have chosen to view such tensions as 
strengths.  HAs have been described as using ‘chameleon-like activity’ (Blessing, 
2012), to avoid undue dependency on public subsidy, whilst harnessing an ability to 
access private financial markets (Mullins and Murie, 2006). Their status as hybrid 
institutions has in effect enabled them to take advantage of both government subsidy 
and private finance.  Many of the assumptions that had underpinned HAs’ operations, 
however, have now been removed - for example, generous government subsidy, 
political consensus about their positive contribution to housing delivery and local 
community support.  As Murtha (2015) maintains, ‘the Government has forced their 
hand’ (p.1). The sector has a duty to respond not only to the government’s efficiency 
drive but also to increase their capacity to deliver new housing in order to ensure not 
only their long run survival but also their legitimacy in the face of wider public 
criticism.  Whilst the London HAs have plans to increase their output and respond in 
particular to the Capital’s housing crisis, diverting attention to meeting a ‘range of 
housing need’ rather than concentrating on providing for the lowest income 
households within London, is likely to have serious consequences for the most 
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vulnerable groups and those with the least ability to pay (London Housing 
Commission, 2016).     
 
Conclusions 
 
Internationally, the historical development of the not-for-profit housing sector created 
an institutional environment where organisations shared a common goal to provide 
low-income groups with decent housing at a price they could afford.  In the UK as 
elsewhere, the policy framework since the 1980s has progressively weakened this 
consensus and a sector (which was always heterogeneous) has been transformed 
under conditions of neoliberalism by changes in exposure to market risk, heralding 
new governance arrangements and business models (Mullins et al 2012).  
 
By framing the way in which contemporary policy uncertainty manifests itself in 
organisational decisions, institutional theory helps to explain how and why the large 
London HAs have been transformed into complex businesses extensively driven by a 
market logic motivated by State withdrawal.  Organisations’ strategic priorities are in 
effect manifestations of, and legitimated by, the institutional logics they face 
(Thornton & Ocasio 2008).  Moreover, the way in which these HAs have responded 
to external pressures offers salient lessons for organisations yet to restructure and 
diversify into commercial activities so that they too become more self financing and 
secure their long term survival.    
 
The paper also brings to the fore wider questions and raises further avenues for 
research.  What future is there for subsidised market rented housing, particularly 
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within a city like London where affordability problems remain unprecedented and 
likely to worsen? What can these organisational changes tell us about the direction of 
travel for housing policy in general in England and for the housing association sector 
in particular? The combination of political pressure to promote owner occupation and 
economic pressures to reduce funding, mean that a market-oriented trajectory is set to 
continue and the sector is likely to become divided between two categories of not-for-
profit housing organisation. Those that are ‘active players’ (Scott 2001, p.179), using 
the market rhetoric to their advantage look to be rewarded by government, whilst 
those that resist or are passive are likely to be left behind (NHF 2016). The trend 
towards greater merger activity within the UK housing sector, as the active 
organisations in particular pursue their growth strategies, is an issue that will provide 
scope for future research study. 
 
When Dutch housing associations adopted an ambiguously commercial logic, they 
soon foundered, eventually requiring State intervention (Nieboer and Gruis, 2014, 
Van der Kuij et al 2016). Given this context, the extent to which the English HA 
sector can continue to pursue a distinctive social purpose, delivering affordable 
housing to those with least ability to pay, may therefore be in some jeopardy, raising 
questions about the wider legitimacy of the housing association sector.  As the 
organisations move inexorably towards a market logic, an inability to respond to the 
needs of households, particularly those most vulnerable to London’s housing crisis, is 
likely to have wider implications for urban policy.  At the same time, in light of the 
2016 UK Referendum result to leave the EU, exposure to risk and vulnerability to 
changes in the housing market may well be accentuated (NHF 2016b, Savills 2016b). 
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Table 1 G15 HAs’ first tranche sales and non-social housing development 
activities: income 2014/15 
 
 Total 
turnover 
First tranche 
sales 
Non-social 
housing 
development 
Development 
activities share 
of total 
turnover 
 £m Change 
on 
year % 
£m Change 
on year 
% 
£m Change 
on year  
% 
2014/15 2013/14 
L&Q 642 11 33.0 6 204 21 37 34 
Circle 412 14 14.5 224 27.2 1,600 10 2 
Notting Hill 381 28 68.5 111 76.8 55 38 27 
Affinity 
Sutton 
430 34 40.1 153 89.8 309 30 12 
Hyde 326 16 34.5 60 52.2 41 27 21 
A2Dominion 297 9 12.4 -42 75.8 42 30 27 
Genesis 282 6 22.2 76 13.8 50 13 8 
Family 
Mosaic 
230 -6 10.2 -52 29.2 -27 17 25 
Peabody 223 35 14.5 113 10.4 -7 11 11 
Catalyst 212 23 40.2 163 50.6 27 43 32 
Network 190 21 24.6 6 28.4 506 28 18 
Southern 
Housing 
175 10 14.9 113 13.5 5 16 12 
East Thames 146 -17 15.5 15 33.9 -41 34 41 
Metropolitan 240 -6 6.4 -35 9.8 -65 7 15 
 Amicus 161 1 4.3 1 - - 3 3 
(source: adapted from Social Housing, 2016) 
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Table 2 G15 HAs’ social housing businesses (2015) 
 
 Social 
housing 
units 
managed 
Gross 
book 
value of 
housing 
properties 
(£bn) 
Turnover 
from 
social 
housing 
lettings 
(£m) 
Turnover 
from 
social 
housing 
lettings 
as a % of 
total 
turnover 
Total 
‘other’* 
social 
housing 
activities 
(surplus/ 
deficits) 
(£000) 
Hyde 41,772 
 
2.63 168 93 (13,507) 
L&Q 28,460 5.53 389 89 6,090 
Genesis 26,700 2.89 234 71 3,800 
Notting Hill 26,700 2.15 171 89 (1,100) 
Southern 
Housing 
23,969 3.06 136 87 3,879 
Affinity Sutton 22,617 3.06 283 93 (4,660) 
Family Mosaic 20,893 2.22 183 86 1,020 
AmicusHorizon 18,633 1.46 146 68 (803) 
East Homes 13,729 1.04 79 67 2,505 
Metropolitan 12,737 2.38 175 87 11,324 
Catalyst 11,892 1.92 112 89 11,728 
Peabody 10,623 1.46 113 76 8,040 
A2Dominion 8,022 1.16 184 84 3,692 
Circle 7,417 1.49 93 98 2,982 
Network 5,839 1.19 69 72 9,298 
England average 1,097 0.09 6.7  222 
England total 361,973 30.1 2.206 80 73,143 
(source: authors compiled from HCA 2016) 
 
*’Other’ social housing activities consist of community investment e.g. employment and 
training initiatives, apprenticeships, debt advice etc to tackle social exclusion 
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Figure 1: An illustration of a G15 hybrid group structure 
 
 
 
** Build for sale and shared ownership undertaken within a non-charitable subsidiary e.g. 
Notting Hill development ltd/A2 Dominion FABRICA/GenInvest ltd/Family Mosaic 
homeownership ltd/ Peabody Enterprise Ltd/ L&Q New Homes ltd etc. 
 
(source: authors adapted from G15 company reports) 
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